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THE COMMON-LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS
OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION BOYCOTTS
IN addition to invoking the aid of courts to end discrimination by govern-
ment bodies, American Negroes have resorted to an ancient form of self-help,
the boycott, to obtain fair treatment from business units. The most publicized
boycott occurred in Montgomery, Alabama, where the Negro community per-
sisted almost unanimously for a year in refusing to do business with the local
transit company.' As the price of their patronage, Montgomery Negroes
demanded that Negro drivers be employed on runs through Negro districts,
that bus drivers be instructed to discontinue abusive treatment of Negro pas-
sengers, and that a seating plan be adopted which would not require Negroes
to give up their seats to white passengers.2 Since the boycott continued after
the company offered substantial compliance with these demands and until the
Supreme Court forbade enforcement of statutes requiring segregation on in-
trastate busses, it was clear that a basic goal was to end segregation itself.3
Similar boycotts against discrimination in services and employment have been
begun or threatened in at least two other southern cities.4 And even if the
Supreme Court prohibits all forms of state-enforced segregation,5 it seems fair
to predict that boycotts will continue as a weapon against privately imposed
discrimination in services and employment.
If to Negroes the boycott is a necessary instrument in the struggle for equal
opportunity, to the courts it raises the very difficult question of the place of
self-help in a government of laws. Judges appear inclined to apply the same
rigid limitations on economic coercion that stifled labor boycotts in the first
1. The boycott was triggered on December 5, 1955 by the arrest of a Negro for
refusing to yield her seat to a white passenger. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1955, p. 31, col. 2.
From its beginning, the boycott had the almost unanimous participation of Montgomery
Negroes. Id., Jan. 8, 1956, p. 71, col. 1. Apparently, the function of its leaders was to plan
the car pools that became substitutes for bus transportation. Id., Feb. 27, 1956, p. 17, cols.
1, 2. In accordance with announced plans, the boycott was terminated upon transmission
to the District Court of the Supreme Court's mandate in Gayle v. Browder', 25 U.S.L.
WEEK 1069 (Nov. 13, 1956), prohibiting enforcement of Alabama bus segregation statutes.
Newsweek, Dec. 31, 1956, p. 18.
2. Transcript of Record, pp. 8-9, State v. King, No. 7399, Cir. Ct. Montgomery
County, Ala., March 22, 1956.
3. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1956, p. 68, col. 6 (company offers) ; id., June 6, 1956, p. 1,
col. 5 (statement of Rev. M. L. King, Jr. that boycott would end "whenever it becomes
possible to go back on city buses on an integrated basis.") ; id., Nov. 15, 1956, p. 38, col. 7
(vote by Negro community to end boycott as soon as injunction against segregation on
buses becomes effective).
4. Tallahassee, Fla. (boycott begun), N.Y. Times, 'May 30, 1956, p. 27, col. 5; May
31, 1956, p. 13, col. 3, and Birmingham, Ala. (boycott threatened), id., July 12, 1956, p.
14, col. 4.
5. See note 57 infra and accompanying text.
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decades of the century.6 Leaders of the Iontgomery boycott have been in-
dicted and one convicted under an Alabama criminal statute that restates
restrictive common law principles. 7 In other states, boycotts aimed at obtain-
ing fuller employment opportunities for Negroes have been enjoined.8 Ulti-
mately, the answer must be derived from an ambiguous constitutional and
common law background shaped by considerations of social policy.
THE ColamoN LAw OF BoycoTTs
A boycott is the use of economic coercion to compel certain conduct on the
part of a businessman, the coercion consisting of a concerted refusal to deal
with the business until the boycotters' demands are met.9 If the boycotters
have sufficient economic strength among themselves, they may merely agree
not to patronize.' 0 Boycotters usually attempt, however, to induce others to
join with them; these active boycotts may take the form of pickets, written
communications or word of mouth."
Under common law principles, interference without "just cause" with an-
other's reasonable expectations of business is tortious. 12 So highly valued is
freedom of contract, however, that the individual refusal to patronize, even
though malicious, is never a tort.13 But because of the greater injuries which
6. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 237 Mass. 537, 130 N.E. 86 (1921) (strike
and picketing seeking collective bargaining enjoined) ; Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336,
94 N.E. 316 (1911) (boycott for union shop enjoined) ; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492,
57 N.E. 1011 (1900) (same); FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INjUNCriON 27-28
(1930). For a discussion of the doctrine of just cause from a contemporary perspective,
see Forkosch, The Doctrine of Just Cause Applied to Labor Cases, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 178
(1950).
7. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 54 (Supp. 1955) ; N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1956, p. 1, col. 6
(indictment of 115 Negroes) ; id., farch 23, 1956, p. 1, col. 2 (principal Negro spokesman
convicted).
8. Hughes v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948), aff'd, 339 U.S. 460
(1950), see text at notes 66-74 infra for discussion; Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178
Atl. 109 (1935) ; A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946
(Sup Ct. 1934).
9. See, e.g., cases cited notes 12 and 16 infra.
10. Economic power is, of course, a prerequisite for a successful boycott. The boycott
for racial equality has been most successful when staged against concerns that depend heav-
ily upon Negro patronage. The revenues of the Montgomery bus company declined greatly,
resulting in a 30% reduction of service and a 50% increase in fares. N.Y. Times, March
10, 1956, p. 14, col. 6. The transit company in Tallahassee has greatly curtailed operations
because of reduced income. Id., Aug. 2, 1956, p. 11, col. 5.
11. See, e.g., cases cited notes 12 and 16 infra.
12. Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889) ; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45
Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842) ; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 105, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080
(1896) (dissenting opinion of Holmes, J.) ; RESTATEmENT, TORTS 765 (1934) ; Holmes,
Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 3 (1894).
13. FTC v. Raymond-Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565, 573 (1924); United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) ; Green v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 24 F.2d
378, 382 (2d Cir. 1928) ; RESTATEMNT, ToRTs § 762 (1934).
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group action can inflict,' 4 the common law condemns concerted refusals to
deal,"; as well as inducements of others not to deal.16
Since "just cause" is nowhere defined, courts have been forced to supply
its meaning in terms of their own, often conflicting, policy views.17 While it is
clear that not every boycott directed by a group is unlawful, there is more
agreement on the indicia of illegality than on the tests of legality.
Sure Signs of Illegality: Violence, Secondary Parties and Objects Contrary
to Public Policy
As order is a prime objective of the law, boycotts furthered by violence are
always illegal.' 8 Even when only some of the means are violent, the peaceful
ones may be restrained as well.' 9 Some courts have gone further, holding that
boycotts conducted peacefully by the participants are illegal if they threaten
to evoke violent responses from others.
20
Protecting parties from being involuntarily drawn into a controversy is an-
other policy of the law. Not infrequently, groups boycott one businessman
solely to force him to compel another, with whom the boycotters have a dis-
pute, to yield to their demands.21 In such a situation, the victim of the boycott
is not the source of the boycotters' grievance, and cannot, by himself, give
14. This rationale is open to an objection made sixty years ago by Holmes: a com-
bination of laborers or small businessmen may do far less harm than an important business
or corporate "person." Holmes, supra -note 12, at 8-9; see also Handler, Unfair Com-
petition, 21 IowA L. REv. 175, 208 (1936).
Moreover, a simultaneous and unconcerted refusal to deal by five thousand would appear
to be as free from reproach as the refusal of one. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMaIITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 36-42 (1955) (more
than evidence of parallel action is necessary to prove a conspiracy).
15. Heim Brewing Co. v. Belinder, 97 Mo. App. 64, 71. S.W. 69 (1903) (dictum);
Finnegan v. Butler, 112 Misc. 280, 182 N.Y. Supp. 671 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Handler, Unfair
Competition, 21 IoWA L. REv. 175, 207 (1936) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 765 (1934).
16. Council of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 Fed. 390 (8th Cir. 1920)
(inducement of boycott against Hearst newspapers) ; A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson,
153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (picketing to induce racial employment
boycott) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766 (1934).
17. E.g., cases cited note 12 supra.
18. Local 111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315
U.S. 740 (1942) ; Local 122, Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Int'l Alliance v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 437 (1942) ; FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNcTION 33-34 (1930); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 766, 767, comment a (1934).
19. E.g., Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 294
(1941) ; Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 315, 174 N.E. 690, 693 (1931) ; Exchange Bakery
v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 269, 157 N.E. 130, 135 (1921) (dictum).
20. Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 Atl. 109 (1935) (racial employment boy-
cott) ; A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct.
1934) (same). See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
21. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1920); Loewe v. Lawlor,
208 U.S. 274 (1907) ; Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trade Council, 23 F.2d 426 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 594 (1928) ; Barnard & Graham, Labor and the Secondary
Boycott, 15 WASH. L. REv. 137 (1940).
1957]
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them complete satisfaction. To avoid economic injury, he must aid the boy-
cotters in their dispute with another, but this may also put him to considerable
cost, since he is forced to find new, possibly less profitable, business relation-
ships.22 Such economic pressure on innocent third parties-known as the
secondary boycott-was outlawed at common law long before it was attacked
by statute.
23
The third mark of illegality derives from the refusal of courts to permit the
compulsion of acts contrary to public policy. Boycotts that seek to compel their
victims to break a law are always illegal. 24 The same is true of boycotts that
urge acts against judicially determined public policy.2 5 By an extension of this
doctrine, boycotts are illegal if the court finds that to compel the act defeats
public policy, even though the act itself, if voluntarily committed, would be
unobjectionable. Thus, in one case, a boycott that sought to compel a single
entrepreneur with no employees to observe union hours was enjoined.2 6 The
entrepreneur would not have violated public policy had he voluntarily kept
such hours.2 7 But as the well-being of small businessmen was thought to be
of vital concern to society, the court would not condone the compulsion of
any act that might impair a self-employer's ability to compete.
2
8
22. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 466 (1920) ; Loewe v. Law-
lor, 208 U.S. 274, 294-95 (1907) ; Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912 (8th Cir. 1897).
23. Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., supra note 22 (common law) ; Anderson & Lind
MTfg. Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 308 Ill. 488, 139 N.E. 887 (1922) (same) ; Pickett
v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906) (same) ; Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts
i Labor Disputes, 47 YALE L.J. 341, 343, 370 (1938) ; Barnard & Graham, supra note 21,
at 137, 139. For discussion of an exception to the common law rule, see note 34 infra.
Secondary boycotts by laborers were held to violate the antitrust laws in Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927), Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1920), and in Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1907). But the
Norris-LaGuardia Act insulated them from injunction. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101-15 (1952) ; Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F.2d 284 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 595 (1934). The Taft-Hartley Act made certain forms of the secondary boycott
unfair labor practices. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (a) (1952) ; Note, 64
YALE L.J. 1201-02 (1955).
24. Building Serv. Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (compelling violation of
statutory policy against compulsory union membership) ; Giboney v. Empire Storage Co.,
336 U.S. 490 (1948) (compelling violation of state antitrust law).
25. Hughes v. Superior Ct., 339 U.S. 460 (1950), for discussion see notes 70-73 infra
and accompanying text; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
26. Teamsters Union, AFL v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950). Secondary boycotts also
may be viewed as falling within this category. For it would not be against public policy
for the victim to refuse, of his own accord, to deal with the primary disputant, but the
higher cost to the public of enlarging the area of labor conflict is an undesirable effect
that boycotters may not seek. Note, 64 YALE L.J. 1201, 1206 (1955). However, because
boycotts labeled secondary involve the additional factor of injury to an "innocent" party,
and because the policy against such boycotts is universal, they are treated separately. See
notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text. For some difficulties in labeling, see note 34
infra.
27. Teamsters Union, AFL v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 475 (1950).




Boycotts marked by violence, secondary victims or forbidden goals cannot
meet the requirement of "just cause."'20 Those that contain none of these
characteristics can usually be found to subserve some approved policy. Some-
times justification is found in the competitive norms of a free economy.30 In-
juries in the market to an inefficient competitor are thought to inure to the
benefit of the public. 3 1 Thus businessmen have been allowed to use the boycott
to stabilize and improve their competitive position,32 subject to the limitations
of the antitrust laws.33 As labor won the status of a competitor in the eyes
of the law, it too became entitled to better its position through boycotts.34 And
in one case, consumers lawfully boycotted in protest against high prices.35 At
other times, the justification for a boycott lies in a policy of enabling those
responsible for the welfare of others to fulfill their duties. For example, a
minister has been deemed privileged to induce his congregation to withhold
patronage from a newspaper thought to have insulted his church.3 6
29. See notes 12 and 17 supra and accompanying text.
30. Katz v. Kapper, 7 Cal. App. 2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (1935) ; Deon v. Kirby Lumber
Co., 162 La. 671, 111 So. 55 (1926) ; Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen 499 (Mass 1867);
logul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889); Handler, Unfair Competition, 21
IowA L. REV. 175, 202-09 (1936); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 768 (1934).
31. See BOULDING, EcoNoMic ANALYSIs 621-22 (1941); SAAMUELSON, EcoNomIcs
512 (1948).
32. See note 30 supra.
33. Handler, supra note 30, at 208-09. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
34. Early cases refused to regard labor as a competitor and forbade any concerted at-
tempts by workers to better their lot. Rex v. Journeymen-Taylors of Cambridge, 8 Mod.
10, 88 Eng. Rep. 9 (K.B. 1721) ; Cordwainers' Case, Yates' Select Cases 111 (N.Y. 1810) ;
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 2-5 (1930) ; see dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Holmes in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (1896).
But objects such as higher wages and better working conditions have long been deemed
legal, thus excusing strikes and boycotts against the primary employer. WITTE, THE Gov-
FRNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTEs 31 (1932) ; FRANKFURTER & GREENE, op. cit. supra at 26-27;
RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 799 (1934).
In a famous dissent, Mr. Justice Brandeis recognized that concerted refusals to handle
non-union goods are justified by "the unity of interest throughout the union, and that, in
refusing to work on materials which threatened it, the union was only refusing to aid in
destroying itself." Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 482 (1920). The
"unity of interest" doctrine adumbrated in Duplex broadened the area of legal boycotts.
By finding such unity, the courts avoided calling the boycotts secondary and hence illegal.
Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937) ; Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y.
342, 117 N.E. 582 (1917); Grant Constr. Co. v. Saint Paul Bldg. Trades Council, 136
'Minn. 167. 161 N.W. 1055 (1917) ; FRANKFURTER & GREENE, op. cit. supra at 44-46.
35. Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 274 N.Y. Supp. 250 (Sup. Ct. 1934)
(boycott protesting high price of bread).
36. Kuryer Publishing Co. v. Mesmer, 162 Wis. 565, 156 N.W. 948 (1916). Examples
of a similar privilege are Watch Tower Soc'y v. Dougherty, 337 Pa. 286, 11 A.2d 147
(1940) (clergyman's threatened boycott caused radio station to cancel plaintiff's broad-
casts) ; Jones v. Cody, 132 Mich. 13, 92 N.W. 495 (1902) (school principal discouraged
pupils from patronizing candy seller) ; Guethler v. Altman, 26 Ind. App. 587, 60 N.E. 355
19571
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In still other situations, the justification for the boycott is that its object is
to force its victim to comply with law.37 Not all courts have been sympathetic
to these private means of law enforcement, however. Threats to prosecute
sellers of obscene literature, resulting in their refusal to deal with the pub-
lisher, were enjoined on the ground that adequate formal sanctions existed by
which the pornography could be banned. 38 Perhaps the decision can be de-
fended on the ground that one group should not be allowed to act as censor
for another, but it is difficult to justify a broader exception to a rule permit-
ting boycotts that promote public policy. Legal remedies may be slow or in-
effectual ;39 indeed, if they were not, the group would rarely make the effort
involved in organizing a boycott. To show "just cause" the boycotters would
have to show the illegality of the conduct against which the boycott was
directed. Since the conduct would thus be proven illegal, there is little reason
for a court to protect it.
BOYCOTT LAW IN A CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The Constitution offers some protection to boycotters who effect their pur-
poses by inducing, rather than agreeing with, others not to patronize. Agree-
ments not to patronize may be prohibited without risk of conflicting with con-
stitutional safeguards, 40 but a stringent standard obtains for the regulation of
(1901) (teacher doing same with malice) ; Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W.
204 (1913) (same but no malice). See RESTATEIENT, ToRTs § 770 (1934).
The recent efforts of Catholic groups to discourage by threats of boycott the selling of
books and exhibition of movies the groups consider salacious, see Fischer, The Harm Good
People Do, Harper's Mag., Oct. 1956, p. 14, would appear to fall within the category of
legal boycotts here suggested. Contra, American Mercury, Inc. v. Chase, 13 F.2d 224 (D.
Mass. 1926), discussed at note 38 infra and accompanying text.
37. Cement Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1926) (boycott
against buyers using fraudulent buying practices) ; Sugar Institute v. United States, 297
U.S. 553, 598 (1936) (dictum) ; Fashion Originators Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 84
(2d Cir. 1940) (dictum).
38. American Mercury, Inc. v. Chase, 13 F.2d 224 (D. Mass. 1926). There was doubt
in this case of the illegality of the material sold and no evidence on the point was intro-
duced. The court simply stated that the only right of the defendants was "to come to the
courts with complaints of crime." Fashion Originators Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941), holds only that boycotts against parties violating state laws would not be privilegcd
when the boycotts themselves were violations of the federal antitrust laws.
39. Under the discretionary prosecution system, the citizen is powerless to compel
enforcement of the law. For criticism see Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy
for District Attorneys' Unwarranted Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209-14 (1955).
40. For cases interdicting combinations to refuse to deal, see note 15 supra.
Agreements to induce should be entitled to whatever free speech protection is given
individual inducements just as agreements to advocate sedition are subjected to the same
test as individual utterances. Dennis v. United States, 341. U.S. 494 (1951). Of course,
numbers may be relevant in determining whether a clear and present danger exists. See
Dennis v. United States, supra at 510-11. Some courts have avoided the constitutional
question by analogizing agreements to induce to agreements not to patronize. Council of
Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 Fed. 390 (8th Cir. 1920). And others have
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inducements. In Thornhill v. Alabama 41 the Supreme Court held that peace-
ful picketing, a form of inducement not to patronize, is protected by the First
Amendment. A fortiori, less coercive inducements should enjoy at least the
same protected status.
42
The Constitution, however, does not protect speech that creates a clear and
present danger of substantive evils that states have a right to prevent.4
3  If
loss of trade were such an evil, all boycotts could be outlawed. Significantly,
Thornhill did not consider the loss of exzpected business a "substantive evil."
'44
Thornhill equated picketing with free speech; later cases, stressing its coer-
cive effect on disinterested parties, have labeled picketing "something more
than speech." In a series of cases the Supreme Court has apparently con-
cluded that picketing which is unlawful under ordinary boycott law does not
qualify for First Amendment protection. Thus in Giboney v. Empire Storage
Co.45 a state was permitted to enjoin picketing that urged its victim to violate
state antitrust laws ; in Hughes v. Superior Court 4' to enjoin picketing seek-
ing to force a businessman to violate anti-discrimination policy; and in Team-
sters Union v. Hanke 47 to enjoin picketing that sought a concession which
would place self-employers at a disadvantage. In view, however, of the Court's
emphasis on the peculiar nature of picketing, solicitations made through forms
of traditionally protected speech-newspapers, leaflets or by word of mouth-
may still be as free from restraint as political addresses.4 8 If so, such solicita-
tions could be forbidden only if the requisites of the clear and present danger
test are met.
49
rejected the free speech argument by viewing some inducements as forms of coercion not
equivalent to speech. Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E.2d 12 (1947) (picketing);
see also note 42 infra and accompanying text.
41. 310U.S. 88 (1940).
42. The Supreme Court has often stressed that picketing contains elements of coercion
as well as of speech. E.g., Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (con-
curring opinion of Douglas, J.) :
"Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol
of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce
action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which
are being disseminated."
Building Serv. Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950) ; Milk Wagon Drivers Union
v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1942).
43. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952) (race libel) ; Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (violence).
44. Following Thornhill, the Supreme Court voided injunctions against peaceful pick-
eting in Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943) ; Bakery Drivers
Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Carlson v.
California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940).
45. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
46. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
47. 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
48. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) ; see notes 41-44 supra and accompany-
ing text.
49. Note 43 supra and accompanying text.
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But even if Giboney, Hanke and Hughes are interpreted to apply to all
forms of inducements not to patronize, the First Amendment still has mean-
ing for boycotters. For these cases only allow a state to prohibit a boycott
when its goal is contrary to public policy. A prohibition against inducements
because of the conjectural possibility others might be incited to violence would
be unconstitutional. 50 The possible reaction of the community is an inadequate
standard of legality when speech is involved; even if violent reaction is certain,
the First Amendment cases suggest that the lawbreakers rather than the boy-
cotters be penalized.51 Similarly, a requirement that otherwise protected speech
be resorted to only after formal methods of law enforcement had been e:-
hausted might constitute an invalid restraint. 52 And of more importance than
the fact that First Amendment protection has not been withdrawn from those
boycotts traditionally valid,53 is the fact that the First Amendment provides a
basis for the Supreme Court to oversee the application of boycott principles
by a state court.54
50. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 721-
22 (1931) ; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376-78 (1927) (concurring opinion) (all
rejecting speculative community reaction as a basis for interfering with speech) ; cf. Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) ; Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) ; Chap-
linsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (allowing interference with speech cal-
culated to evoke violent reaction on the part of the hearers-"fighting words" doctrine).
51. Ibid. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 319
(1941) (dissenting opinion). The possible reaction of others is a questionable standard
even absent First Amendment considerations since it is more often a matter of conjecture
than of proof. The fears of race riots resulting from racial boycotts expressed in A. S.
Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934) failed to
prove well founded in so widespread a boycott as that in Montgomery. See note 55 infra.
52. Speech has been protected from sanctions based on a legislative or judicial deter-
mination that other means of achieving its purpose are available and more desirable sub-
stitutes. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (rejecting argument that pamphlet
distribution littered the streets and that material could be distributed elsewhere). The
state, before it can prohibit speech must show a legitimate purpose for doing so, Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) ; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), and
must show that the interference is not unnecessarily restrictive, Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Comment, 65 YALE
L.J. 1159 (1956). Restrictions on speech based solely on the availability of other means
would satisfy none of these criteria. See also text following note 38 supra.
At least one commentator has suggested, however, that speech incidental to economic
coercion be denied First Amendment protection. Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56
HARv. L. REv. 180 (1942). But see Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56
HARv. L. REV. 513 (1943), and Jaffe, Picketing as Free Speech, 41 MIcH. L. REV. 1037
(1943). To do so would be to establish as the criterion of the First Amendment's scope the
dichotomy between inducement and discussion first negated in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919), and laid to rest by Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
Indeed, it would be ironic to accord speech intended to effect economic improvement less
protection than speech designed to encourage the government's overthrow.
53. See note 44 supra. The Supreme Court adhered to this analysis when it held that
secondary boycotts were not protected by the First Amendment. International Brother-
hood of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951). See also note 23 supra.
54. While the Supreme Court has many times voided state interference with speech,
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THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION BOYCOTT IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
COMMON-LAW MATRIX
If the Montgomery boycott is its prototype, the boycott against discrimina-
tion will neither be furthered by violence nor directed against secondary
parties. 5 The grounds for stopping such a boycott must, therefore, be that its
goal conflicts with public policy.
Effect of Unconstitutionality of Segregation Statutes
Under the public policy test, statutes requiring segregation in various intra-
state activities once proscribed integration as a goal for boycotts. 56 Since the
recent Supreme Court decision on bus segregation leaves little doubt that all
segregation statutes are unconstitutional,5 7 boycotts for desegregation no longer
fit into the clearly illegal category of boycotts compelling violation of a law.
But where, as in Montgomery, a desegregation boycott did not await this de-
cision, the boycott's victim was forced to gamble on the constitutionality of the
e.g., cases cited note 52 supra, it has said that it views with deference the reasons offered
by state courts for restraining speech, e.g., Teamsters Union, AFL v. Hanke, 339 U.S.
470, 479-81 (1950) ; Hotel Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S.
437, 441 (1942). But the Court has also said that the usual presumption supporting state
determinations is counter-balanced by the preferred place of speech in our constitutional
scheme. E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) ; United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
55. Very little testimony of violence was introduced in the case of State v. King, No.
7399, Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Ala., March 22, 1956, which was the first trial of a
boycotter in Montgomery. Such as there was was not connected with the boycott. See
Transcript of Record, pp. 181, 185, 189, 191, 192, 194, 196, 199, 202-11, State v. King, supra.
There was considerable testimony showing that peaceful conduct of the boycott had been
urged by its leaders. Id., pp. 38, 48, 221.
56. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
57. Gayle v. Browder, 25 U.S.L. WEEK 3144 (Nov. 13, 1956), affirming without
opinion Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956). The Supreme Court's
only opinions on the unconstitutionality of segregation were delivered in the school segre-
gation cases. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
487 (1954). There the Court emphasized that inferiority feelings which result from segre-
gation detract from the education received. If the rationale of these decisions were that
the psychological effects of segregation make a separate but equal education impossible,
then segregation statutes for activities less dependent on the participant's mental state
might still be constitutional. For example, it is difficult to argue that a ride in the back of a
bus is inferior to that in the front. But the Fourth Circuit seemed to think that the school
segregation decisions rejected the separate but equal test entirely. When it banned segre-
gation in recreation, it argued that there was even less reason for government-enforced
segregation in areas where attendance was optional. Dawson v. Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386
(4th Cir. 1955). The Supreme Court affirmed without opinion, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), and
simultaneously reversed a contrary decision by the Fifth Circuit with instructions to con-
sider the Fourth Circuit's decision on remand, Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
The Supreme Court's affirmance of the district court's bus segregation decision, Browder
v. Gayle, supra, appears final proof that segregation is unconstitutional per se.
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statute." If, for example, the Montgomery bus company had ceased to enforce
the statute only later to see its constitutionality upheld, it would have been
subject to criminal sanctions and the loss of its franchise ;9 continued enforce-
ment, on the other hand, resulted in a drastic loss of business.60 Such a hard-
ship on the company might be reason enough for a court to consider the boy-
cott unlawful.6 1 But the boycotted company had a convenient exit from its
dilemma. Had it sought to enjoin the boycott, it could have compelled the boy-
cotters to raise the unconstitutionality of the segregation statute as a defense ;"'
58. In view of the restrictive interpretation that could have been given the Supreme
Court's only opinion on the unconstitutionality of segregation, see note 57 supra, the possi-
bility that segregation on buses would be upheld was not inconceivable.
59. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 48, § 301(31a) (Supp. 1955), provides for segregated seat-
ing and a fine of $500 for each day a company fails to enforce segregation. Section 301
(14) provides for the revocation of franchises for any violation of § 301.
60. See note 10 supra.
61. This might be done by analogy to secondary boycotts. For, as in the case of the
secondary boycott, the victim of a boycott to end segregation required by statute is not
primarily responsible for the boycotter's grievance. See -notes 26-29 supra and accompany-
ing text. On this theory boycotters could be held civilly and criminally liable for their
conduct prior to the Supreme Court's annulment of bus segregation. Gayle v. Browder,
25 U.S.L. WEaR 3144 (Nov. 13, 1956). But the boycott could not be enjoined after the
decision on the ground that the conduct prior to the decision was unlawful. For an in-
junction, unlike damages or punishment, is strictly a sanction against current, not past,
behavior. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 445 (1920);
POmFmROY, EquITY JURISPRUDENCE § 112 (5th ed. 1941).
Holding boycotters liable for seeking to compel violations of existing statutes is incon-
sistent with case law that unconstitutional statutes are void from the date of inception.
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) ; Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd.,
209 Ga. 613, 75 S.E.2d 161, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 823 (1953). But exceptions have been
carved out of this rule for persons who acted reasonably in reliance on the validity of a
statute. See State v. Garden City, 74 Idaho 513, 265 P.2d 328 (1953) (persons relying on
constitutionality of statute authorizing gambling may not be penalized by confiscation of
apparatus and interdict of premises).
62. The constitutionality of a statute that affects the relationship of private parties
may be tested in a suit between those parties. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619
(1937) (shareholders suing to restrain corporation from paying taxes may question the
constitutionality of taxing statute) ; Naim v. Naim, 170 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749, remanded,
350 U.S. 891 (1955), original judgment affirmed, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849, vtwtion to
vacate remand denied, 350 U.S. 985 (1.956) (constitutionality of statute prohibiting mis-
cegenation raised in suit for marital annulment).
The state may be afforded the opportunity to defend the constitutionality of its statute
in an action between private parties. Special statutes may accord the state the right to
intervene in a proceeding in which the constitutionality of a statute is in issue. E.g., 28
U.S.C. § 2403 (1952); N.Y. EXEC. LAw §" 71; cf. A.. CODE ANN. tit. 55, § 228(1)
(Supp. 1955) (at the request of a municipality, state may defend constitutionality of local
ordinance). Absent such special statutes, the typical modern code provision conferring a
right of intervention on parties with an "interest" in the proceedings, e.g., id. at fit. 7,
§ 247, may 'be interpreted in favor of the state. See Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newten, 256
Fed. 238, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (dictum); Note, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 152, 160-61 (1938).
And if intervention is unavailable, a court may allow the state to appear as amicus curiae.
See Note, 51 HAgv. L. REv. 148 (1,937).
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if the injunction were denied, the company could safely have refused to enforce
the statute.63
Although the invalidation of segregation statutes removes one bar to boy-
cotts, it does not convert desegregation into a lawful object for boycotters. As
the Constitution demands only that states, not individuals, accord equal pro-
tection,'4 private companies could of their own accord continue providing ser-
vices on a segregated basis.65 In such a case, a boycott designed to compel
desegregation would have an object other than the enforcement of the consti-
tutional mandate and would present issues similar to those raised by the fair
employment practices boycott.
Boycott Against Discriminatory Hiring Practices
The judicial attitude toward boycotts against racially discriminatory hiring
policies of private employers has been one of distrust and disapproval. Four
such boycotts have reached the courts. In three of the cases, the boycotts were
enjoined,"' in the fourth, injunctive relief was barred by statute.67 Central to
two of the decisions granting injunctions, however, was the court's conjecture
63. In fact, injunction is the usual remedy against boycotts, see notes 18-28 supra and
accompanying text, although in Montgomery the boycotters were prosecuted for crime.
See note 7 supra.
Absent jurisdictional defects denial of the injunction would necessarily be predicated
on the statute's unconstitutionality. Otherwise the company would be entitled to protection
from compulsion to violate the law. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
64. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shel-
ley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
65. Several Alabama officials have adopted an attitude of defiance toward the bus
desegregation decision. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1956, § 4, p. 2, col. 6. Convincing the transit
companies to adopt segregation as a company policy offers a logical way of circumventing
the decision.
A policy of segregation adopted by a state-owned company or by a private company
performing a governmental function should be as unconstitutional as a statute requiring
segregation. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Accordingly, a boycott to
compel such a company to desegregate would be a lawful mode of enforcing a constitutional
mandate. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text. But the fact that the boycotted
company is a public utility, operating under a charter from the state, may not be sufficient
to render its adoption0 of a segregation policy the action of the state. Cf. Broad River
Power Co. v. Query, 288 U.S. 178 (1933) (company operating dam under license from
federal government is not a governmental agent and may not therefore claim exemption
,from state taxes).
66. Hughes v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 850, 193 P.2d 885 (1948), aff'd, 339 U.S. 460
(1950) ; Green v. Samuelson, 168 1d. 421, 178 AtI. 109 (1935) ; A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v.
Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
67. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 561 (1938). In hold-
ing that a racial employment boycott was within the ambit of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act's prohibition of injunctions in labor disputes, Mr. Justice Roberts said:
"The desire for fair and equitable conditions of employment on the part of persons
of any race, color, or persuasion and the removal of discriminations against them
by reason of their race or religious beliefs is quite as important to those concerned
1957]
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that the boycotts might spawn violence. 68 In so far as the boycott is protected
by the First Amendment, however, it cannot be banned merely because of
possible violent reaction by others.0 9 Significantly, in Hughes v. Superior
Court,7 0 the one case in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of a state court's injunction of fair employment picketing, more substantial
grounds for outlawing the boycott existed.
In Hughes the object of the boycott contravened a legitimate policy of the
state of California. The boycott was directed at achieving an employment
quota for whites and Negroes that was proportionate to their patronage. 71
Such a system, though assuring Negroes employment opportunity, necessarily
made race, not just merit, a basis of hiring. Although California had no stat-
ute on the subject, the judicially declared state policy was that race should be
an irrelevant consideration in employment. 72 As the boycott for the quota sys-
tem sought violation of this policy, the Supreme Court was merely applying
standard boycott and First Amendment doctrine when it affirmed the injunc-
tion.
73
So viewed, Hughes provides no basis for prohibiting boycotts directed to-
ward replacing racial barriers with a merit system rather than a quota system.
For such boycotts would actually promote rather than offend the anti-discrimi-
nation policy of a state. Where, as in the case of California, this policy is not
implemented by criminal or civil remedies, 74 the boycott is the only means of
making the policy effective. Where the policy is embodied in a statute, the
anti-discrimination boycott may serve as a useful and nonviolent alternative
to official enforcement.
While the large number of states that have a policy against discrimination
in employment should allow boycotts for a merit system, those states that do
not share this policy may be constitutionally precluded from adopting a con-
as fairness and equity in terms and conditions of employment can be to trade or craft
unions or any form of labor organization. .. "
Of the three other courts that have faced this issue, note 66 supra, one has said that racial
boycotts are not labor disputes because the aggrieved group is not a labor union and is
not seeking better wages or hours. A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, supra note 66, and
another has rejected the labor dispute rationale because the boycotters were not employees
of the victim, Green v. Samuelson, supra note 66. The California court did not reach the
question. Hughes v. Superior Ct., supra note 66.
68. Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 Atl. 109 (1935) ; A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v.
Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp, 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934). The Montgomery boycott
seems to show that such conjectures were greatly exaggerated. See notes 51 and 55 supra.
69. Note 50 supra and accompanying text.
70. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
71. Hughes v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948). But see the dis-
senting opinions of Justices Carter and Traynor, arguing that the real goal of the boycott
was non-discrimination.
72. Hughes v. Superior Ct., supra note 71.
73. See text at notes 24-28 supra.
74. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 66: 397
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION BOYCOTTS
trary one. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids state action which has the
effect of denying equal protection of the laws. 5 It is clear that a state statute
requiring racial discrimination in employment would be unconstitutional. 76 And
the Supreme Court has held that a court decree upholding private racial dis-
crimination is subject to the same constitutional infirmities as a statute requir-
ing that discrimination. Thus in Shelley v. Kraemer 77 and Barrows v. Jack-
son 78 the Court held that state courts cannot enforce, either by injunction or
award of damages, agreements which exclude Negroes from housing. Similar-
ly, injunction of anti-discrimination boycotts is state action protecting dis-
crimination, and, on the rationale of Shelley and Barrows, should be held
unconstitutional.
Nor should a court be able to evade the state action doctrine by holding that
the policy of the state is to accord employers freedom of choice in hiring. A
similar argument was advanced in Shelley and Barrows: the policy of the state,
it was contended, was merely to allow covenanters freedom of contract.79 The
Supreme Court held, however, that a policy of free choice cannot be used as
a cloak for discrimination."0 The case is as strong for anti-discrimination boy-
cotts, for they are often the only weapon against discrimination.8 ' Since the
sole determinant of the legality of a boycott must always be public policy,8 2 a
state should not be able to adopt a policy that will help private companies to
maintain discriminatory hiring policies. Similar reasons should prevent a state
from outlawing a boycott against private discrimination in services.
Reinforcing the equal protection argument, an economic justification sanc-
tions the fair employment boycott. American Negroes can fairly claim a com-
mon economic interest similar to those which have helped to win judicial
approval for concerted action by competitors,8 3 laborers 84 and consumers8 5
While numerous factors are responsible for the fact that the per capita income
of southern Negroes is half that of the rest of the population, the most impor-
75. See note 64 supra.
76. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (state action awarding damages for
breach of racial restrictive covenant unconstitutional since it results in protecting dis-
crimination) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (injunction enforcing similar cove-
nant invalid since it enforces discrimination) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
(ordinance forbidding sale of property in certain area to Negroes unconstitutional state
action) ; Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956) (dissenting opinion argues
that court may not enforce collective bargaining agreement which provides for political
discrimination in employment).
77. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
78. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
79. 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
80. Ibid.
81. Only eight states have adopted fair employment practices laws. Note, 68 HARv.
L. REv. 685, 686 n.3 (1955).
82. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
83. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
84. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
85. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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tant cause is lack of employment opportunity.85 Negroes are often excluded
from skilled jobs and confined to those which pay the least and offer little
chance for advancementyt The Negro cannot hope to eliminate this insuper-
able impediment to a higher standard of living by individual action, any more
than the laborer could expect to raise his wages by individual action.88 The
class must, therefore, be allowed to use its economic power to better its posi-
tion. Just as manufacturers have been allowed to foreclose competitors from a
market and laborers have been permitted to deprive manufacturers of a labor
supply, 9 Negroes must be permitted to deny their patronage to businesses that
contribute to their economic inequality by discrimination.
Thus, boycotts seeking fair employment opportunities should be permitted
provided that they are not furthered by violence nor directed against secondary
parties. If the state declares its policy to be opposed to such boycotts, the
Supreme Court should invalidate the policy on Equal Protection or First
Amendment grounds. Such action would further implement the Court's bold
decisions against segregated education,0 for education may be no more than an
impractical luxury to those denied an equal opportunity for employment.
Difficulty can be anticipated, however, in determining whether the boy-
cotters are seeking fair employment practices or a discriminatory hiring sys-
tem. Often the boycotting group will be satisfied only if one of its members
is hired, and the employer who, on the basis of a merit system, has failed to
hire a Negro may be unjustifiably injured. Faced with a claim by the em-
ployer that he is not discriminating, courts must determine whether his refusal
to hire Negro applicants has been based on racial considerations. Although
difficult, this question has been adequately answered in states in which fair
employment practices acts have been passed.91 And in many boycotts it will
be perfectly clear that the employer has pursued a discriminatory policy. For
example, in a city with a large Negro population, the only explanation for the
absence of Negro bus drivers is a blanket policy against hiring Negroes.
2
86. GINZBERG, THE NEGRO POTENTIAL 13, 15 (1956); see MYRDAL, AN AIMERICAN
DILEMMA 391-96 (9th ed. 1944); Morrow, Anerican Negroes-A Wasted Resource,
Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1957.
87. Only one of eight southern Negroes is employed in a white collar or skilled job
as compared with one of two southern whites. GINZBERG, THE NEGRO POTENTIAL 24-25
(1956). That lack of skill is the only reason for this discrepancy is disproved by the
fact that earnings of educated Negroes are far lower than those of similarly trained whites.
Id. at38.
88. Id. at 29,36-37.
89. See notes 32 and 34 suzpra and accompanying text.
90. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
91. For discussion of the enforcement of these acts, see Note, 68 HA~v. L. REv. 685,
693-4 (1955) ; Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 837, 860 (1947).
If boycotters unjustifiably claim that an employer is discriminatory, they may be liable
in tort for business slander as well as unlawful boycott. PROSSER, TORTS 590-92 (1955).
92. Cf., e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (Negroes available for jury ser-
vice, but none drawn in panel of sixty establishes prima facie case of discrimination) ;
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Practical and Constitutional Checks Against Proscription
In permitting anti-discrimination boycotts, the law would only be reflecting
realities. For unlike the labor boycott, the racial boycott cannot be feasibly
and constitutionally suppressed. The labor boycott seeks to influence persons
outside the group of organized labor. Since such persons may not be aware of
the existence of a labor dispute, continuous picketing is essential to the labor
boycott's effectiveness. 93 But the anti-discrimination boycott need depend only
on the unanimity of the aggrieved group. Once the boycott is induced it can
continue without overt stimulation. 94 The leaders may be enjoined from further
inducement, but the only complete remedy would be an injunction against all
individual refusals to patronize: on its face an impractical remedy. And al-
though damages, if adequately proven, could be exacted from the inducers to
the extent of their ability to pay, the mass of participants would not be 'sub-
ject to suit for merely refusing to patronize.,
In view of the inadequacy of civil remedies, it is not surprising that criminal
prosecutions were used to end the Montgomery boycott. An Alabama statute
provides criminal penalties for persons who "without just cause or legal ex-
cuse" combine for the purpose of impairing lawful business. 96 Such a statute
is probably void for vagueness, however. The Supreme Court itself has noted
that the term " 'without just cause or legal excuse' has no ascertainable mean-
ing either inherent or historical. ' ' 9 7 A statute so viewed does not furnish a
boycotter with the warning required by due process that his conduct is illegal.98
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (no instance of Negro ever having served on jury
makes prima facie case of discrimination).
The manager of the bus company in Montgomery denied that there was a declared
policy against hiring Negroes. Transcript of Record, p. 521, State v. King, No. 7399, Cir.
Ct. Montgomery County, Ala., March 22, 1956. He explained that there had never been
Negro applicants, id. at 526; but in answer to another question, he stated that it was not
customary to hire Negroes. Id. at 530. If the Negro community was aware of the custom,
it is not surprising that no Negroes applied. And since large numbers of Negroes in the
South have recently been employed in drivers' jobs, GINZBERG, THE NEGRO POTENTIAL
25 (1956), it does not seem likely that lack of interest explains the absence of Negro bus-
drivers in Montgomery.
93. See Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942) ; AFL v. Swing, 312
U.S. 321,326 (1941).
94. The defense in State v. King offered some evidence to show that the Montgomery
boycott was spontaneous rather than induced. Transcript of Record, pp. 336, 354, State v.
King, No. 7399, Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Ala., March 22, 1956. But considerable
testimony of numerous meetings during the early days of the boycott at which "pep talks"
were given by Negro leaders was also given and not contradicted. E.g., id. at pp. 38, 48.
95. Individual refusals are not tortious. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
96. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 54 (Supp. 1955).
97. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 100 (1940). The statute invalidated in Thorn-
hill immediately preceded the anti-boycott statute in the Alabama code and was similarly
worded. But see Lash v. State, 244 Ala. 48, 14 So. 2d 229 (1943) (holding the anti-boy-
cott statute sufficiently certain because it bans unlawful conduct).
98. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948) ; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ; Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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Moreover, the vagueness defect is likely to inhere in any statute codifying the
common law of boycott. For boycott law is intended to give the judges the
very discretion in balancing interests that the vagueness doctrine prohibits. °
CONCLUSION
In the recent segregation cases the Supreme Court unequivocally expressed
a national policy of equal opportunity which, although traditional, has long
been unevenly applied. Influenced as they must be by this mandate, the flex-
ible standards of the common law and the often unqualified directives of con-
stitutional precedent assume a meaningful shape. The legality of the anti-dis-
crimination boycott is clear, its value unquestioned, in the pursuit of equality.
99. Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 (1941) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296,308 (1940).
